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Eleanor Roosevelt, 1958

'Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home -- so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person... Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.' Eleanor Roosevelt, 1958

The Small Places has moved...

The Small Places has moved to a new home here, including all the old posts. Any posts after 6th March 2014 will appear on the new website, but old posts are preserved here so that URLs linking here continue to work. Please check out the new site.
Showing posts with label open justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label open justice. Show all posts

Tuesday, 16 July 2013

What constitutes news?

I am completely befuddled by what constitutes news.  John Hemming MP drafts an Early Day Motion calling for some random inquiry for Parliament to review urgent applications in the Court of Protection.  That's news, according to the Daily Mail and the Independent.  Parliament actually sets up a dedicated Committee to examine the functioning of the Mental Capacity Act - covering various issues around human rights, the Court of Protection and even hears evidence on urgent applications.  That is not news (or at least, it is not news that I have been able to locate anywhere except the ever-trustworthy Community Care).

Not a month passes, it seems, without a newspaper headline proclaiming 'secrecy' in the Court of Protection or the Family Courts.  Sir James Munby - the new President of the Family Division and the Court of Protection - announces the first in what looks set to be a whole series of major transparency reforms.  Is that news? Apparently not.

Monday, 15 July 2013

One step closer to Open Justice

It's a while since we've had an Open Justice post...  but we knew it couldn't be long with Munby LJ being appointed the new President of the Family Division and the Court of Protection.  As readers will know, there are various issues around transparency in the Court of Protection as a result of s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960, which renders is a contempt of court to publish information about proceedings held in private.  Under the Court of Protection Rules 2007, the judge can choose to hear a case in public, or authorise publication of information about proceedings held in private, which they have done on various occasions.  However, this is contingent upon somebody (typically the media) making an application for them to do so, or a judge exercising his or her discretion to authorise publication of the judgment on BAILII or MHLO (or Family Law Week - who knows where they'll pop up next! I wonder whether there is any rhyme or reason for where these judgments end up?).  So, the judgments that end up in the public domain are not necessarily representative of the typical work of the Court of Protection, and (as I've written about before) you can even end up with the indefensible situation of lawyers being able to cite cases in court which aren't even in the public domain...

Anyway, readers who've read Munby LJ's own' commentaries on transparency (like this one) in the Family Division and the Court of Protection were probably anticipating changes.  Upon appointment he stated:

Thursday, 4 July 2013

Parliamentary privilege and the Mental Capacity Act Committee

Just a quick update to say that I heard back from the House of Lords Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, who confirmed what others had said to me - that it is not a contempt of court to submit evidence to the Committee about proceedings in the Court of Protection.  I contacted the Committee to ask about this because ordinarily disclosing information about proceedings in the Court of Protection which are held in private is a contempt of court (see s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960), and this prohibition has been very broadly interpreted (In the Matter of B (A Child) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam)).  As Wanda Maddocks could tell you, it is also enforced.

Happily, evidence submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee is protected by an old constitutional guarantee of Parliamentary Privilege, which the clerk of the Committee kindly explained in her email and said I could reproduce here for you to read:
Witnesses’ remarks made in solicited written or oral evidence to select committees are protected by parliamentary privilege. This means that witnesses cannot be prosecuted for what they say in written or oral evidence to a committee; and evidence to a committee could not be used in court to support a prosecution or civil suit. However, it is worth noting that it is only in the context of parliamentary proceedings that the evidence is protected. Parliamentary privilege does not protect a witness if they repeat their evidence outside Parliament.
Given the sensitivities of the circumstances, the Committee will wish to consider how, if at all, to publish the evidence received. That will depend in part on the nature of what is submitted.
In addition, if the Committee decided on the basis of a written submission to call an individual for oral evidence, we would expect that session to take place in private. The Committee would need to consider what record, if any, would be taken of the session.
So, if you have stories about experiences of proceedings in the Court of Protection that you would like to share with the Committee, you can submit written evidence to them.  Don't forget though, this protection doesn't apply if you publish or disclose this information to anybody else.  Even once you've written to the Committee, it could still be a contempt to tell other people or the media about the proceedings, or stick your evidence on your blog or whatever.  Just to repeat that: just because you are protected when telling the Committee, doesn't mean you are protected telling anybody else.  Furthermore, the Committee may choose to redact your evidence, or not to publish it at all, as Parliamentary Privilege must be exercised responsibly.  Please remember (if you are reading this in the future)*, when the Equality and Human Rights Commission open their inquiry into the deprivation of liberty safeguards, this privilege will not apply.

Just a reminder - here is the call for evidence.

*I mean, obviously you are, but the distant future when the EHRC inquiry opens...

Friday, 22 June 2012

A what-I-missed-while-on-holiday roundup

Ten days without mobile phone reception or internet on honeymoon the West Highlands...  My intention was to not even think about mental capacity whilst I was away, but unfortunately the novel I took with me had a subplot of unlawful deprivation of liberty in a nursing home and several interesting 'right to die' cases popped up in the news which I pondered whilst puffing up Munros. They concern, of course, the cases of Tony Nicklinson, and the recent Court of Protection case concerning the forced feeding of 'E', a young woman with anorexia nervosa, and I wrote about them here. This post, however, is a bit of a round-up of things I found in my inbox on my return.

Open Justice


In case you missed it, there's been a buzz about open justice this week, with Adam Wagner at the UK Human Rights Blog writing a great post on how the 'democratic deficit' in our courts isn't related to 'unelected judges' but about access to information.  Adam argues:
...judges tend to come from the Bar. They are used to being a hired brain, squirreling away at clever written advice in the secluded surrounds of the Temple. That culture means that the courts resemble private members clubs rather than public fora where important decisions of social policy are being made every day.
This is no longer good enough. Judges and the Government fail to understand that in the internet age, open justice does not just mean opening the door to the courts. It means a completely new understanding of the old adage “Not only must Justice be done; it must also be seen to be done“.
I agree! With rather good timing, the Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism at City University published their working papers from Justice Wide Open, an event earlier this year bringing together lawyers, judges, journalists and researchers to debate open justice in a digital age.  Judith Townend, who organised the event, writes a summary of the topics covered on the Inforrm blog.  There are papers by Geoffrey Robertson QC,the Master of the Rolls Lord Neuberger, Dr David Goldberg, Hugh Tomlinson QC, Emily Allbon, Nick Holmes, David Banisar, Heather Brooke, Mike Dodd, Adam Wagner, William Perrin, Professor Ian Cram, Dr Lawrence McNamara and yours truly.

Reports and resources

Various interesting reports, resources and articles found their way into my inbox whilst I was away, which might be of interest to others.
  • The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has produced two interesting reports lately.  One relates to involuntary detention in EU member states, and makes frequent reference to the possible impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on detention under EU and Council of Europe law.  Glancing over it briefly, I'm not sure it goes as far as some CRPD advocates might hope, but certainly it makes interesting reading and offers some comparisons between frameworks for involuntary placement in different EU states. The other report relates to the right to independent living for disabled people in the EU. The headline of these reports is 'Despite legislation, disability rights not realised in practice'. (H/T to @neilmcrowther for those reports, who contributed to the latter).
  • The Mental Health Alliance have published a report reviewing the implementation of the Mental Health Act 2007.  The report highlights several problems with the implementation of both the MHA and the deprivation of liberty safeguards, and is well worth a read.
  • The Journal of Policy and Practice in Intellectual Disabilities has published a paper by Romijn and Frederiks comparing the regulation of restraint in various different jurisdictions.  It was prompted by the case of Brandon, which readers may remember was a young autistic teenager who was 'tethered' to a wall by an order of a judge in the Netherlands.  The paper is interesting, although in my view doesn't quite distinguish carefully enough between law and guidance (at least in relation to the UK), and a few important areas of law are not discussed, but still interesting reading.  (And paywalled reading, sorry about that...)
  • And there are some interesting free webinars from Browne Jacobson legal training on DoLS and health and social care, available here, they are well worth watching.  Particularly if, as has recently been reported, training on the deprivation of liberty safeguards is becoming 'unaffordable'...  It is interesting to ponder how 'affordable' DoLS training might become if the chances of litigation for unlawful detention were higher.  But unfortunately the chances of litigation are themselves contingent upon good training and good practice to support use of the safeguards and appeals mechanism, so unhappily there is no obvious source of pressure to remedy this situation.  But I digress -watch the webinars!
'Maximum Expenditure Policy' - Yours thoughts?

Worcestershire County Council are consulting on a very concerning policy for capping maximum expenditure for adult social care at the rate of care home costs. In effect, unless other means of support can be found, where the costs of care in a person's own home cannot be met for less than the value of care in a residential home, then a person will either have to move into a care home (by consent or coercion, one presumes) or live with unmet care needs. My instinct is that if they get this through, then other local authorities may follow and we should be extremely concerned about what this will mean for rights to independent living, to family life and to the likelihood of using detention frameworks to coercive people into cheaper care home accommodation against their wishes. (not to mention fettering, etc etc). I can think of several local authorities who have (at least in the past, when I worked with them) operated informal policies of this nature - "oh no, if she needs more than 4 homecare visits a day it's off to a care home...." However, it's quite bold to see a council seeking to make it an explicit policy, and if offers an opportunity to explain how restricting community care expenditure in such a way can have such significant repercussions on the rights of older and disabled people and their families.

My gut instinct is the only people this policy will be financially advantageous to are the community care lawyers of Worcestershire; I can't imagine how a rash of DoLS appeals as people are coerced into care homes, or judicial reviews relying on Article 8, will help Worcestershire County Council's finances. I am working with the Spartacus Campaign to produce a response to this consultation, and we would be very interested to hear your views and any help campaigning against this policy that you can offer.

Monday, 7 November 2011

A few thoughts on the Guardian's Court of Protection piece

The Court of Protection hears cases about some of the most excluded and silenced people in our society.  It is surely a good sign that the media, that MP's and campaigners are sufficiently concerned about their plight that they take such an interest in this court's new jurisdiction under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  As Amelia HIll has written in the Guardian today, the new Court of Protection came into being in 2007; the primary difference between this Court of Protection and the 'old' Court of Protection is a jurisdiction to hear matters of care and welfare.  According to the most recent Court of Protection report, the vast majority of the court's workload is taken up with property and affairs matters; fewer than 2000 of the 23,000 cases the court heard last year concerned welfare and care matters.  Nevertheless, it is these cases that capture the imagination of the public and the media.  Rightly so.  Amelia Hill is right to draw attention to the types of sensitive and controversial issues that fall within the court's jurisdiction: whether a person should continue to live with their family, or be removed from their care; levels of contact with family members in the presence of allegations of abuse; matters relating to sexuality like whether a person should be allowed to have sex, whether a person should be given contraception or be sterilised, whether a person should have an abortion; matters relating to medical treatments, including the power to coerce medical treatments and surgeries against a person's resistance, etc etc.  This court deals in the most intimate and personal matters in a person's life.  The question the Guardian has taken up, as other media outlets have before, is whether the court should be more open to ensure the decisions it makes are subject to proper levels of scrutiny and debate.

I have written quite a bit on this before (collected under the tag Open Justice), and my primary contention has been that the general rule that identities should be protected and information in the public domain should be subject to court imposed restrictions is appropriate and promotes justice.  I echo the words of Fenella Morris quoted in the Guardian: 'It seems to me there's an unfairness in saying that if you lack capacity, you don't have the right to the same level of privacy and dignity as the rest of us.'  However, I believe there should also be a general rule that written judgments are published for every case (particularly care and welfare cases), and that unless there is a very good reason (given in the judgment) any public authorities involved should be identified.  On the question of media attendance of hearings, I would be interested to know how many hearings the media have actually been refused access to.  From the sounds of what journalists tell me, the process for applying to attend a hearing is costly and involved; I'm sure improvements could be made and I'd like to see what recommendations they propose.  But I'm not sure a general rule of an open court would promote justice.  The media have tended to be involved in cases where families have sought them out and desired that they attend; I doubt that the majority of families involved in Court of Protection proceedings would want this.  The biggest concern would be that a full media gallery would have a chilling effect upon applications applications to the Court of Protection, and drive these decisions further underground away from even the scrutiny of the courtroom.

What I feel many in the media and family justice movement have failed to understand, is that before the Mental Capacity Act 2005 created the Court of Protection these kinds of decisions - around sexuality, medical treatments, family life - were still being taken, but without any kind of judicial oversight.  They were taking place in staffrooms, far from the eyes of either the law or the media, and only rarely did anybody seek judicial authorisation for controversial decisions like removing somebody from their family or forcing medical treatments upon them.  Only rarely would a family manage to challenge a decision they disagreed with.  The Mental Capacity Act 2005 hasn't just magicked up a whole range of new practices that interfere with liberty and family life; it has attempted to impose the rule of law on coercive practices that were already occurring, and offer families an appropriate route to challenge them.

The deprivation of liberty safeguards are another example of where the court's new powers to detain a person in their best interests impose the rule of law on practices that were already - are already - occurring throughout the country on an unscrutinised, unmonitored, and unchallengeable basis.  In the limited amount the deprivation of liberty safeguards have been reported upon, the media have tended towards the view that "more deprivation of liberty authorisations = bad".  This couldn't be further from the truth.  In all seriousness, what did they think the DoLS have changed?  Do they think the care homes and hospitals have suddenly started detaining a whole population that they didn't before?  The truth is that these people were already detained, and they were detained without any legal framework to reduce its arbitrariness and guarantee them a right to appeal.  The issue the media should be concerning themselves with is not that the courts have new legal powers to deprive people of their liberty; but that people up and down the country are currently deprived of their liberty without any legal powers at all.

I was interested that in a separate interview with the Guardian Sir Nicholas Wall:
...used the interview to discuss the court's controversial deprivation of liberty safeguards, which allow council or NHS officials to restrain someone in a hospital, care home or retraining facility for as long as the state deems it to be "in their best interests".
At present, these powers are only available to judges sitting in the high court in London. Wall, however, revealed his support for broadening the remit to include circuit and district judges, with a consultation launched in the next month.
"If we are at the stage where case law has been established, then we can gradually work our way towards having people outside London who are competent in the work of the court of protection, acting as judges," he said.
Care and welfare proceedings in general, and the deprivation of liberty safeguards in particular, are said to be causing significant problems within the Family Division of the High Court, through diverting judicial resources away from their normal business of family cases without any increase in resources.  It is no wonder that Sir Nicholas Wall, then, would want these cases to be heard by circuit and district judges.  I would be interested to see what the consultation finds though, as the case law seems to me to be far from 'established' - in the DoLS at least.  Only a few weeks ago a high court judge refused to rule on whether a person was deprived of their liberty or not, because the case law was so unclear.  Perhaps that will change when the Cheshire ruling comes out though.

I just wanted to take issue with a few comments made by John Hemming on the Court of Protection, reported in the Guardian.
First, he says, the "secrecy" of the process – which can extend to families being ordered not to complain to their MPs about cases in progress – undermines the fundamental principle of British law that justice must be both done and seen to be done.
It strikes me that Hemming is seeking to conflate issues he regularly campaigns on in family justice matters with the Court of Protection.  Indeed, that may be why the article cites the case of Rachel Pullen as a Court of Protection case, when - although it did concern issues of mental capacity - it was surely primarily a family court case concerning her children.  I've never really known what evidence Hemming bases his contention that the family courts are ordering families not to complain to their MP upon, but I would absolutely astonished if this was occurring in the Court of Protection.  I challenge him - and media outlets that reproduce this claim - to provide evidence that a Court of Protection judge has even once ordered a family not to complain to their MP.  [Edit 07/11/2011: John Hemming has been in touch to say that he knows of specific examples where a Court of Protection judge has made such an order. However, he says he can't provide more information without getting his constituents into trouble, which is fair enough.  It was apparently discussed on 17 March 2011, I think in this debate, although I'm not clear which of these cases he is referring to.]

Second point:
The second problem, [Hemming] says, is the use the court makes of single experts to sum up all the evidence presented, instead of a range of experts giving varied opinions.
Instead, Hemming wants disputes dealt with under a tribunal system, where people who are detained may appear in person instead of having decisions taken on their behalf by the official solicitor, on the advice of a single expert.
I have to say I find this argument absolutely laughable.  One of the key differences between the Court of Protection and tribunal systems is surely that such a range of experts and other witnesses are called upon.  That is precisely why Court of Protection cases are lengthy, costly and involved, and why it would be hard to deal with them under a tribunal framework.  It is my contention that the 'best interests' framework under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has significantly shifted the balance of power away from 'single expert' justice, because it covers such a range of issues.  Unlike many other areas of law, the Court of Protection judges absolutely do not defer to the authority of medical experts, or single experts.  In fact one of the things that is striking about cases like W v M (the case of the minimally conscious woman whose family sought to allow her to die) is the range of voices heard that would normally be ignored in the courts.  Baker J heard evidence not only from medical authorities, but also Occupational Therapists, Physiotherapists, care home managers and even ordinary care staff - not to mention family.  And all their views were accorded respect and considered in hist judgment.  Take another case on litigation capacity, V v R [2011], the court heard evidence from a psychiatrist, a neuropsychiatrist, two neuropsychologists and the claimant's mother.  This is a far cry from the 'single expert' view that Hemming paints, and I'm not really sure what kinds of cases he is referring to.

As for the idea a tribunal system would be better - does Hemming mean a tribunal system like the one used in mental health?  The one so 'secretive' that the media and 'transparency' campaigners have all but forgotten to campaign about it?  The one where Albert Haines had to fight to have his case heard in public, and where - even so - the hospital sent their PR officer to sit in on his interview with the Independent (I'm sure it was his best interests they were looking out for there...).  Talk about secret justice - where are the published judgments for those cases then?  And this system covers far, far more people.  It's true that tribunals are more 'accessible' in certain respects than the Court of Protection, but that doesn't mean they offer a better guarantee of justice. There is research that suggests that the mental health tribunals do not treat patients particularly fairly, that they discredit the views of patients, and that they defer excessively to medical opinion.  They have to do this, in my view, to get through so many cases so quickly; the difficulty with not having a rigid hierarchy of expertise is that you have to listen carefully to everybody's view - and that takes time.  

I agree with Hemming that there are issues in the way litigation capacity is managed in England and Wales; I'd like to be more convinced that the mechanisms for restoring legal capacity are robust.  I'd like to see the people at the heart of these cases more involved in the court proceedings.  But I'm really not sure on what grounds he thinks a tribunal system will help.  Court of Protection cases are lengthy and involved mainly for the reason I've just pointed out: they don't just defer to the opinion of a single expert, they do take the views of family and P themselves seriously, and they balance a whole range of factors beyond the medical.  The single biggest threat to justice in my view is the lack of resources to enable the court to continue to do that.

Saturday, 15 October 2011

Transparency... Coming to a "secret" court near you?

A few weeks ago I wrote about the Family Courts Information Pilot, a project trialled by the Ministry of Justice and some participating courts whereby written judgments were produced for certain types of cases.  The point of the project was to enable a) children to have access to written judgments in cases that were about them in later life, and b) the public to have access to anonymised versions of these judgments via the website Bailii.

At the time of writing I felt pretty despondent about the likelihood the government would roll out the scheme nationally because of the resources required to produce the anonymised judgments, in a family court system under high pressure.  But on Thursday a comment in the government's response to the House of Commons Justice Committee report on the Operation of the Family Courts made my heart lift:

Tuesday, 27 September 2011

It's all about Bailii

I was very interested to see The Guardian picking up on the issue of published and publically accessible judgments at the weekend in an editorial.  The Guardian discusses the oft-bemoaned issue of the judgments not being indexed by Google or other web indexing facilities, and consequently the limited use we can make of powerful Google search engines and added features (like alerts, or deeper functionality of Google Scholar – here’s an example with US case Brown v Board of Education).  In response to the Guardian piece, Adam Wagner at the UK Human Rights Blog makes an important point – and one which I have not been as quick to point out in the past as I should have been.  Yes, it can be frustrating when judgments don't make their way onto Bailii, when Bailii’s functionality is limited – but Bailii is the wrong target for our frustrations.  In fact, without Bailii, the open justice agenda would be absolutely stuffed. 

Tuesday, 13 September 2011

The Family Courts Information Pilot

Last month the Ministry of Justice published a report of a pilot project that ran last year whereby participating family courts (Cardiff and Wolverhampton County and Magistrates’ Courts and Leeds Magistates’ Court) produced – and published written judgments of certain kinds of Children Act 1989 cases. The project had three main aims:
  • to increase transparency and improve public understanding of the family justice system by publishing anonymised judgments in all serious children cases; 
  • to help parties by providing written judgments in all cases, even where a matter was not contested; 
  • to provide judgments which the children involved could access in later life. 
The Family Courts Information Pilot (FCIP) is of great interest to me, as many similar issues pertain in the Court of Protection around transparency, producing and publication of written judgments and considerations of privacy. I’m sure the family lawyers will blog on the particular issues pertaining to cases under the Children Act (I’m hoping Lucy Reed will soon!), so I’ll stick to some general comments about the project’s findings, and what the implications might be for the Court of Protection if it were to take up the scheme. I won’t rehearse in any great detail the issues around transparency/privacy, as I’ve blogged about them so many times (under the tag ‘Open Justice’), and because in any case Lord Justice Munby has put the arguments for greater transparency in the family courts far more eloquently than I could hope to do in this speech. 

Friday, 29 July 2011

Access, reporting and judgments in the Court of Protection

As Adam Wagner reports, the family courts have just published a Guide to Media Access and Reporting. It was produced in conjunction with the Judicial College and the Society of Editors and was written by two barristers, Adam Wolanski and Kate Wilson.

The report is really handy and readable, and will be invaluable to any journalists (or even bloggers...) wanting to understand how to gain access to family law proceedings, and what they can lawfully report.  The report is helpfully broken up into different sections, depending on the type of hearing.  What is immediately striking, reading the report, is that the Court of Protection is subject to an almost entirely different regime to the Family Courts.  For cases relating to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Protection (so those are cases that do not concern the Mental Capacity Act 2005 - e.g.. concerning vulnerable adults who have capacity), there is no statutory regime in place, but the court has powers to exclude the public or the media at its discretion.  Furthermore, s12(1) Administration of Justice Act 1960 does not apply, as the inherent jurisdiction is beyond the scope of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; therefore 'In the absence of an injunction there would appear to be no restraint upon reporting'.

Sunday, 17 July 2011

Why are the Ministry of Justice courting Courtel?

A while back I was trying to get listings from my local county court, for a trial that I knew was coming up that I wanted to attend.  I was surprised to find only daily listings on Her Majesty's Courts Service website, so I contacted the relevant court and asked them.  They said they could provide me with information on what cases would be heard the next day, but no more.  It turned out they held listings for the week ahead, but they weren't allowed to shared them with members of the public.  If I wanted to attend a particular trial, I would have to harass the poor court officer every day to find out what was coming up.  This seemed like a monumental waste of both my time and theirs.

Monday, 16 May 2011

Whose copyright is it anyway?

Apologies for radio silence, I've been away on holiday and have a few longer posts brewing for later.  In the meantime, I received a response to a Freedom of Information request I made of Her Majesty's Courts Service, which I'll share.  I wrote to HMCS trying to get hold of some data which could cast light on a) what proportion of court judgements make their way into the public domain via Bailii, and b) how much HMCS spends each year on third party transcription services.  Unfortunately, HMCS weren't able to help me with this part of my request as data is not collected on it and they'd have to look at each case individually.  Of some interest, however, is some information they kindly supplied me on a discretionary basis, in response to my querying who owned the copyright of judgments.  I'll quote their response verbatim:
The position regarding copyright in court judgments is not, however, entirely clear. The Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI), is part of the National Archives and manage all copyrights owned by the Crown on Her Majesty’s behalf. Copyright material which is produced by employees of the Crown in the course of their duties and therefore most material originated by ministers and civil servants is protected by Crown copyright. There is no definitive view on whether court judgments are Crown copyright. Although OPSI, following advice from the Treasury Solicitor, take the view that copyright in court judgments rests with the Crown, in that judges are officers or servants of the Crown and their judgments are delivered in the course of their duties, this is not a universally held view and it can be argued that judges act independently of the Crown and that copyright in court judgments rest with individual judges. OPSI’s position is that insofar as judgments are Crown copyright it is content for them to be re-used free of charge and without requiring prior clearance providing the source is acknowledged.
Consideration would need to be given to the rights of reporters and journalists as published editions of judgments attract copyright protection in the typographical arrangement of their published editions although not in the judgment itself. Reporters may also seek copyright protection for additional content such as head notes and other commentary.
So it seems that the situation is not even so simple as considerations of transcription and  typographical arrangement would suggest; the copyright issues also hinge on the constitutional status of the judiciary itself.

In other news, in a major breakthrough for supporters of Open Justice, Supreme Court cases are to be streamed live online.  You can watch them here on Sky's website, and you can read the press release here.  It's a shame in a way there isn't the flexibility of BBC iPlayer - it seems as if you can only watch them live, but it's a great start.  I'd be intrigued to know whether the BBC were approached to provide the service... [Edit: have just written to them asking, will update when they respond.]

And the Court of Protection has published the judgment following on from the so-called 'quaero-injunction'.  In W v M (2011) Baker J casts light on the reasons he issued an injunction against journalists approaching 65 people in a highly sensitive case.  It's not a little disappointing that most of the media clamour around this judgment has focussed on his including Twitter and Facebook in its injunction, in addition to traditional media, and they have neglected to report several other interesting features of the judgment.  Few outlets (Martin Beckford at the Telegraph being a welcome exception to the rule) have noted that the 65-person injunction on doorstepping has shrunk to including only the family.  And perhaps unsurprisingly, few have reported the extreme distress and anxiety potential 'doorstepping' by journalists posed the family.  This engaged not only their own Article 8 'right to private life', but their Article 6 rights to a fair trial as well since the potential press attention had led them to considering withdrawing their case in court.  Their fear of media harassment was such that it had even threatened to discourage them from visiting their relation, in case the press were waiting for them.

It's not really part of the story the mainstream media want to tell about the 'secretive' court that their methods of investigation were a source of considerable distress to some families, which could act as a deterrent against them seeking justice.  The Times Newspapers Ltd, who were represented at the hearing, accepted the evidence of the families and agreed to the reporting and 'doorstepping' restrictions.  Other media outlets, who subsequently complained about the injunction and accused the court of 'secrecy', did not send their own legal representatives to fight their corner.  I presume that though they have seen the injunction, they have not been party to the witness statements by the family that the Times' lawyers saw.  In my view, for what it's worth, compared with the highly unpleasant image of the press doorstepping a very vulnerable woman in her care home, potentially following her about her business outside the home, photographing her and approaching her distressed family and those who care for her, it is hard to agree with the opinion expressed by John Hemming that these injunctions are 'evil'.

Wednesday, 4 May 2011

Does Article 5 create positive obligations to provide community based care?


An article in Community Care this week commented that a cap on charges for non-residential care, introduced last month in Wales, may create ‘a perverse incentive for authorities to place more people in residential care, as they could then recoup more money in charges.’  For reasons of cost, councils may choose to meet people’s eligible needs through residential care placements, rather than supporting them through community-based services.  This is a thorny area.  There is a general preference at policy level - and often (but not always) for service users - for people to be supported in the community rather than having to leave their homes to go into residential care.  But the reality is that community based solutions can cost more, particularly as people’s needs increase.  Working in care, I have known people whose needs increased to a point where local authorities were no longer prepared to support them in their own homes because it became markedly cheaper to meet their eligible care needs in a care home.  Sometimes this was despite their expressed preference to remain where they were.  Are there any legal reasons arising out of human rights law, that might lend weight to preferences for community based care plans?

Wednesday, 27 April 2011

Is publicity always the soul of justice?

Yesterday in parliament an MP used his parliamentary privilege to identify a woman who was threatened with prison for naming the council at the heart of a child protection row she was involved in.  She named her council during a meeting of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Family Law and the Court of Protection discussing Transparency.    The MP was silenced by the Speaker before he had a chance to go any further; Bercow wanted to discuss further – in private – whether the case was in fact sub judice.  No doubt like many others who followed the parliamentary exchange, I sought out information on the identified individual online.  As others have commented, I found no sources of information that gave a particularly well reasoned or calm appraisal of events – which is not to say that what’s written isn’t true.  However what is clear is that allegations made by the mother are extremely serious, both with respect to named individuals and the public authorities involved in the case.  The allegations relate to extremely sensitive and personal information regarding her child, who is also named online.  Even if we assume that the allegations have some foundation in fact, however, I remain unconvinced that this exercise in ‘transparency’ will assist the children at the heart of this case.

Over the last few weeks there has been considerable media coverage of ‘gagging orders’: super-injunctions, hyper-injunctions and quaero-injunctions.  The general consensus in the press, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that they are a matter of grave concern.  Bundled up amongst the celebrity scandals and suppression of matters which – on the surface at least – seem to be in the public interest to know about (Trafigura dumping toxic waste on the Côte d'Ivoire, or paint in ship’s water containers breaking down into toxic chemicals), are several cases relating to the Family Courts and the Court of Protection.  In what I have read, the arguments against ‘gagging orders’ fall roughly into two camps:
  1. Gagging orders violate the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) of a) the media themselves (e.g. this article), and b) the individuals at the heart of the cases (e.g. this article). 
  2. Gagging orders go against the principles of Open Justice, and without the media’s presence miscarriages of justice may go unchallenged – and may even be more likely (e.g. this article, and this one) 
I don’t want to wade into the debate about the Article 10 rights of the media, or of women to ‘kiss and tell’, but I do want to consider in a bit more detail the second argument, succinctly put in these famous passages from Jeremy Bentham:
‘Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.’
‘In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape, have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks, applicable to judicial injustice, operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.’
The best argument I have read for greater openness in the Court of Protection and family courts is by the Guardian’s director of editorial legal services Gill Phillips (transcript and audio are available here; I particularly recommend the audio recording).  Coincidentally, Phillips’ speech was delivered in the same meeting of the All Party Parliamentary Group where the council in the child protection row mentioned above was identified.  Following Phillips’ speech, Cafcass head Anthony Douglas gave a talk which began ‘Transparency has disappointingly become more about the rights of adults than the rights of children’.  The text of Douglas’ speech is also worth reading for a counterbalancing point of view, but he was unable to deliver it in full, being heckled off stage by angry families.  One woman can be heard to say ‘you're so deluded, you have no clue how much the people are suffering in this country’, and another ‘people need to speak and express themselves’.  Douglas hastily wound up his speech saying 'Transparency is about transparency of understanding the situation that the child is going through... not about opening up a court process.'  I would differ from him on that latter point; I believe there are things that could be done to open up the court process without infringing the rights of the child.  In any case, tensions evidently ran high in that meeting.

Phillips began by reiterating that it is a ‘fundamental principle of common law that justice is conducted and judgments are given in public’.  Article 6 permits that the press and public can be excluded from the court:
...in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
It is, as I have discussed previously, an unqualified feature of Article 6 (the right to a fair trial) that judgment must be ‘pronounced publicly’ – but in the case Pretto v Italy (1983) the ECtHR found that this criterion was satisfied by depositing a copy of the judgment in a registry open to the public – it didn’t have to be read in open court.  I have argued in several posts on Open Justice that the Court of Protection, and indeed the courts service as a whole, need to ensure that all judgments that are not read aloud in open court are freely accessible to the public in the form of written judgments.  If necessary, as often will be the case in the Court of Protection and family courts, those judgments should be redacted to protect the identities of children or other protected parties to the case.  My interest in this evidently comes from my role as a legal researcher, but I am aware that legal practitioners, practitioners in health and social care (like CB at Fighting Monsters), and users of the courts, are also keen for greater access to case law to improve their understanding and knowledge.  The courts may protest that they issue any judgments that make legal precedent; from the perspective of informing and improving professional practice, this is insufficient.

Publication of written judgments could go some way towards putting greater external scrutiny on the courts, in the spirit of Bentham’s work.  Not only through greater scrutiny of the reasoning of judges, but on the public authorities involved in the cases themselves. I see no reason why public authorities should not be routinely identified in Court of Protection and family court cases (although I am open to argument if anyone would like to suggest any).  In two cases that I am aware of the Court of Protection has allowed the local authority to be identified (G v E, Manchester (2010); Hillingdon v Neary (2011)).  But the court appears to wait upon a request from the press to identify the public authorities in the case, and there are cases where public authorities have been criticised for – at best – poor practice where they have not been identified (in this case, for instance).  Unless public authorities are identified, it is very difficult to see whether there are repeat offenders for certain kinds of poor practice – or even public authorities who show consistently good practice, for instance by bringing matters to the attention of the courts when they should (see this post for a striking example of this).  As Phillips argues, identifying public authorities along with details of cases can also help expose regional disparities in interpretations of the law itself (the example she uses is major variations between local authority interpretations of ‘emotional abuse’).

Phillips also gives a very compelling argument for identification of expert witnesses in the family courts, which is worth quoting in full:
...decisions more often than not will involve courts relying on expert evidence. If that evidence is only heard behind closed doors who can scrutinize it? who can check the science is sound, challenge it if need be? I read last week about the Law Commissions proposals for a new "reliability" test to determine the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal cases to avoid the possibility of miscarriages of justice... The law commission said that the current judicial approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in England and Wales is "laissez-faire"...The Law Commission gave examples of fraudulent experts: Godwin Onubu, a bogus doctor, Barian Baluchi, a bogus psychiatrist, Gene Morrison a bogus psychologist. At least criminal trials take place in open and are reportable. Heaven only knows what level of scrutiny and acceptance is in the family courts!
The debate about identification of expert witnesses in the family courts is an old one.  There are those who argue that the motivation to identify experts is based on a fallacy that expert witnesses are failing the justice system, others might respond that such absolute faith in unscrutinised expert opinion is naïve at best.  Phillips also makes a convincing case that since expert witnesses in the family courts are in the pay of the public purse, we should at least know who they are and when they are being used.

Since identification of public authorities and expert witnesses could also be done through publication of redacted written judgments, would any additional purpose be served by the media being in court?  I wrote previously that it was my view that the press should be allowed to attend the court only with the full and free agreement of the families involved.  This is because for some families, especially those who are litigants in person, the presence of the media could have an inhibiting effect on the stories they are able to tell, and may increase the stress they are already under such that they are less able to present their case.  For other families though, like the Neary family and no doubt like the lady at the heart of this most recent row, the presence of the press may be explicitly desired by them.  For families who feel themselves to have been badly served by public authorities, the media at least appear to serve as an additional safeguard to ensure justice is done and wrongdoing exposed.

The difficulty is that in what coverage I have seen of the complex cases the Court of Protection deal with, the media haven’t particularly covered themselves in glory (I know less about the family courts, so will refrain from commenting here).  From the perspective of accuracy, the vast majority of articles on Court of Protection cases are riddled with errors of fact and law, which go on to (badly) inform what analysis they do bring (including the Guardian’s own reporting).  This recent article from the Daily Mail serves as a case in point; entitled How can it be right? the author makes the familiar argument that the Court of Protection judges deal with some of the most sensitive issues for the most vulnerable in society, and should not be free of external scrutiny in doing so.  To illustrate the kinds of work the Court of Protection does she describes some recent cases where the press have been allowed in, but in doing so betrays a lack of understanding of the context and the issues at stake.  To give a few examples:
  • ‘Under the laws [sic] of the Mental Capacity Act of 2005, [the Court of Protection] makes decisions for people deemed to lack the intelligence to do so for themselves.’
    • I can see why they have used the word 'intelligence' rather than 'mental capacity', but it carries significantly different connotations. The court, for instance, would hear cases about people in ‘minimally conscious’ states, or with mental health problems, whose intelligence is not in question. Meanwhile, a person with very low intelligence is likely to have mental capacity in respect of some decisions.
  • ‘judges can compel these vulnerable souls to undergo surgery, take part in medical experiments, use contraception or have abortions. They can decide if a life-support system is switched off, where a person lives or with whom.’
    • What the author neglects to mention here is what a significant improvement this situation is on what came before. Prior to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 there was an enormous legal lacuna around how such decisions were made, and many were made by medical or other professionals, free of external scrutiny, and without recourse to the court at all. In addition to the safeguard of the court, people in these situations should also be referred to an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate, who offers an additional source of external scrutiny.
  • 'the CoP judges can authorise what are called Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards.’
    • This is just an error in fact. The judges can authorise deprivation of liberty, but the whole point of the safeguards is that supervisory bodies can authorise deprivation of liberty as well without recourse to a judge. In my view we should be less concerned about deprivation of liberty authorised by the courts than the – quite possibly thousands – of cases of deprivation of liberty that are actually occurring in hospitals and care settings but which are unauthorised by the courts or any other public body. 
  • ‘[Hillingdon council, in the Neary case] applied successfully to the Court of Protection for a Deprivation of Liberty Safeguard or DOLS order.’ And ‘Mark Neary hired a lawyer and decided to take on Hillingdon Council as well as the Court of Protection which issued the restraining order on Steven.’
    • This takes factual inaccuracy to the level of fiction. Hillingdon council authorised Steven Neary’s deprivation of liberty themselves using the safeguards, without resort to a court at all. The court in fact terminated the deprivation of liberty and sent Steven home! 
  • ‘Earlier this year, a 41-year-old man living at a council home, and in a relationship with another man, which he said made him happy, was barred by the Court of Protection from ever having sex with any human being again... He will be followed everywhere for the rest of his life by an orderly at the home, unless he is alone in his bedroom.’
    • Again, this is fiction. The order in this case was an interim order, not ‘for the rest of his life’, and the judge in fact directed that AB should receive sex education so that he might acquire the mental capacity to engage in sexual relations. 
Even in the context of almost universally inaccurate reporting on Court of Protection cases (the Telegraph, generally, is a welcome exception to that rule)[Edit: I feel in the light of this case I should probably retract that and say instead that Martin Beckford's reporting is usually fairly accurate], this is a particularly bad article.  But it does serve my point.  What benefit is this kind of scrutiny supposed to bring to our justice system?  The judgments in the cases mentioned above are in fact in the public domain, and even then they are reported incorrectly.  What the media often does do is champion the rights of families, by which I mean to say the rights of those family members who are able to express their views – not necessarily always the rights of the protected parties at the heart of the cases.  By all means the media should be free to disagree with the decisions of judges, the evidence of experts, to castigate any unlawful actions by public authorities, but ultimately the courts and the lawmakers will only be responsive to the concerns of the media if they have something well-informed and insightful to say on the matter.  I’m not saying this isn’t possible, just that I’ve seen little evidence that the media are yet ready to take up that mantle in the Court of Protection at least.

And what about identifying the individuals involved, as happened in parliament yesterday?  The Court of Protection does not operate a blanket ban on this, notably identifying Derek Paravicini in this case, and of course the Neary case.  The family court may exercise its discretion in permitting the media to watch the case, but they are still subject to statutory restrictions on identifying children from s97 Children Act 1989 and s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960.  Further restrictions may come into force with the Children, Schools and Families Act 2010.  Phillips regards this as a real obstacle to media coverage of important family law cases:
As long as these two provisions remain in place, the media are going to be reluctant to engage with the family court. The fact is, like it or not, names are needed to make stories work. They bring a case to life and give it real meaning... [T]he reality is that the combination of S12 AJA and S 97 Children‘s Act means there is little possibility of the media being able to report anything that they feel may be of interest to their readers. The reality is that despite the increased access, little has changed and there is still little being reported about family cases.
I suppose my feeling on this really is ‘well tough’, if the issues are that important it shouldn’t be an insurmountable obstacle, although this is no doubt coloured by my not being a journalist.  I really can’t understand why the press cannot report on these cases without naming names.  For weeks after the death of Baby Peter, he was known as ‘Baby P’, but that didn’t prevent extensive media coverage of the case.  I don't doubt, though, that experienced media professionals like Phillips know better - but I would like to think that if important matters of principle are at stake (as there are in the cases reported recently, which remained anonymous), the press would pick up on them anyway.

My concern is that in identifying the children at the heart of these cases – particularly child protection cases and cases where there is a dispute over family contact - there is a real risk of harm being done by the media coverage itself.  Often, but not always, similar principles may apply to adults in the Court of Protection, particularly in matters relating to adult safeguarding.  We respect the right of rape victims to anonymity, why not children who have suffered abuse or acrimonious family disputes over contact?  Why should all the professionals in their lives, all the parents in the playground, and their future friends and colleagues be appraised of some of the most personal and painful details of children’s lives through publication of their name?  Does it help children if parents are able to play out their breakup and make allegations in the press?  Expose poor judicial decision making, poor expert evidence, poor practice by local authorities by all means – but why should we expose children and vulnerable parties as well if this will cause them harm?

This will, inevitably, have an impact of the Article 10 rights of families.  It is impossible to identify the family members without the child or adult relation becoming identifiable by extension.  I really do understand that when families feel failed by the justice system they want to speak out.  Put purely legally, Article 10 rights are qualified rights, and the right of the child to privacy of their current – and future – identities must be balanced against them.  Beyond legal rights though, I support the moral case underpinning this.  Families may respond that they are not speaking out for themselves, but in order to expose injustice and get their children home.  Unfortunately, I’m not convinced as a strategy this will be particularly effective; if anything going to the press is likely to antagonise the courts.  If families have signed an undertaking of non-disclosure to MPs or the press, going back on that order is likely to make them appear less trustworthy on matters relating to their child's welfare.*  And yes, it is a huge pity if families are prohibited (or, more likely, advised against) speaking to their MP - but if it is suspected that that MP is likely to trample over their children's rights to privacy through use of parliamentary privilege I'm less convinced it is the certain travesty of justice it at first sight appears.  In any case, ultimately it’s not the Daily Mail who decides whether their children come home, any more than they decide whether ‘Elisa’s’ daughter gets sterilised, whether ‘Alan’ has sex again, or who even got Steven Neary home.  It’s the courts, whatever view you hold of them.

There is a tension then.  Overall the interests of justice may be served by greater press attention to matters in the family courts and the Court of Protection.  The courts could help themselves by being more forthcoming with the reasons for protecting identities or reporting restrictions, or issuing seeming-draconian orders like banning the media from approaching witnesses.  They could also take positive steps to engage with transparency themselves, by publishing more (anonymised) judgments.  Transparency may also be served by naming the public authorities and expert witnesses involved in cases, whilst protecting – as far as possible – the identities of children and other protected parties.  In some cases a press presence in the courtroom may directly further the individual or overall cause of justice, for instance by exposing faulty expert evidence, or by building up pressure to reform a particular area of law a judge has relied upon.  But the media say they want names, and in naming individuals involved in many cases we may do them no justice at all.  How principled is their stance towards Open Justice then, really, if it is contingent on identifying vulnerable individuals?  It seems to me that the media may have as far to go on this as the courts.

*It's unclear, in any case, how far these are legal undertakings and not elective agreements.  See this post by Carl Gardner, and the comments underneath, for more discussion.  It does seem that this case must have some degree of legal force behind it, if the mother was threatened with prison for identifying the council in a public meeting.

More reading
@CarlGardner raises some important questions about whether  this use of parliamentary privilege was appropriate, here
CB at Fighting Monsters discusses the difficulty knowing the truth behind stories in the press, here.

[Edit: My attention was drawn today to an excellent paper by Lord Justice Munby on transparency in the Family Courts.  He puts the issues much better than I have, and clearly his view carries considerably more weight!  The paper I am referring to is:
Lord Justice Munby, 'Lost opportunities: law reform and transparency in the family courts' [2010] Child and Family Law Quarterly 273
But it's behind a paywall.  However Jonathan drew my attention to a lecture that covers roughly the same ground, available here.

It's wonderful that a senior judge has expressed concerns around Open Justice in the family courts.  I'm not sure that all share Munby LJ's passion for transparency though... 04/05/2011]

Friday, 25 March 2011

'Open Justice' (yet another) footnote

Following up on the topic of Open Justice and also relating to 'secrecy' in the family courts, I wanted to briefly discuss two issues arising from John Hemming's comments in a debate on parliamentary privilege last week.  The first is a link to a very interesting blog article by Carl Gardner at Head of Legal.  Of particular interest are the comments below the blog post, where John Hemming himself and others engage in interesting debate about the rights of constituents to speak to their MP's about active court proceedings, and issues relating to media coverage of Court of Protection and Family Court cases.

The second issue relates to a particular comment made by John Hemming at Column 153WH relating to the publication of judgments.  In previous posts on Open Justice I've written about my frustration - and that of others - at the lack of published Court of Protection judgments on Bailii (or even elsewhere).  Hemming cites Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights, which correctly* should read:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
There does, to my mind at least, seem to be a tension between Article 6 and the lack of public judgments from the Family Courts and Court of Protection.  This may also be problematic in terms of the limited number of High Court judgments that make their way onto Bailii due to copyright issues.

Whilst the right to a fair trial itself is a limited one, the right to public pronouncement is unqualified.  I only know of one ECtHR judgment relating to this, and that is Pretto v Italy (1983).  In Pretto, it was claimed that Italian courts had 'had violated the rights of the defence by basing its decision on a judgment which had not yet been published and could not have been known to the applicant's lawyer' and that 'By not pronouncing their judgments publicly, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had failed to satisfy a further requirement of Article 6 § 1'.  The ECtHR found that:
The public character of proceedings before the judicial bodies referred to in Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) protects litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the achievement of the aim of Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1), namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is one of the fundamental principles of any democratic society within the meaning of the Convention [21]
However the court also acknowledged diversity among member states as to the scope and manner of implementation of this 'principle of publicity' [22].  Article 6(1) is not, the ECtHR stated, to be interpreted strictly as meaning the judgment must be read aloud publicly, but states could also fulfil its requirements in other ways.  The Italian court in question had deposited the judgment in the court registry 'with written notification of the operative provisions being given to the parties, but not pronounced in open court' [24].  Anyone could have access to this judgment if they made an application to the Court registry [27].  Asked to decide whether the Italian court had contravened Article 6(1) because it had not read the judgment aloud in open court, the ECtHR ruled that:
...the object pursued by Article 6 § 1(art. 6-1) in this context - namely, to ensure scrutiny of the judiciary by the public with a view to safeguarding the right to a fair trial - is, at any rate as regards cassation proceedings, no less achieved by a deposit in the court registry, making the full text of the judgment available to everyone, than by a reading in open court of a decision dismissing an appeal or quashing a previous judgment, such reading sometimes being limited to the operative provisions. [27]
The question remains, therefore, whether judgments that are not read aloud in open court, nor placed in a registry where they will be 'available to everyone' meet the requirements of Article 6(1).  It may well be that the judge themselves has given leave for a judgment to be reported, subject to restrictions, but that does not mean in practice that a copy of the judgment is publicly available.  Is it sufficient for a judgment to be in principle available, if one is prepared to make a request of the court and pay for transcription services?  How is one to know of the existence of such a case?  It would be rather an empty right to most people if this were the case.

There are a few Family Court cases which discuss Pretto, but they seem only to do so in the context of allowing the media in or not, so I can't find any real discussion of the issues around public access to judgments.  If anyone can think of any cases which advance the argument that all judgments should be made publicly available, please feel free to suggest!  On my reading at least, the case does seem to add legal weight to the view that judgments should not be, in effect, inaccessible to the public on the basis of copyright and restricted resources.

*Unfortunately either Hemming cites an incorrect version or else Hansard writers have copied it incorrectly (I think the mistake may originate from here, which is the first version that comes up on Google).  [Edit: John Hemming has directed me to a video of the statement, which suggests the mistake is in the transcription not the reading.] The version in Hansard states 'Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial' (italics mine).  A correct version of the Convention can be found on the ECtHR website, here.

Tuesday, 22 March 2011

Afterthoughts on 'Open Justice'

I wrote a few weeks ago about some of the specific issues for improving transparency in the Court of Protection.  Since then, I’ve become aware of a veritable blogswarm of discussion and debate about Open Justice in a wider sense.  Various recent developments have contributed to this online debate: tweeting being permitted in the Supreme Court, the Court of Protection opening its doors to journalists in several recent cases (reported here, here and here), the use of parliamentary privilege for an MP to reveal the use of super-injunctions and hyper-injunctions by the courts, and a recent speech (pdf) entitled 'Open Justice Unbound' by  the Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger.  I feel very strongly that justice in the UK is ripe for improvements in the transparency of the courts, and accessibility of information.  If this truly is the government of transparency and accountability, perhaps they'll listen to this growing clamour and turn their attentions to the Justice system.   I want to offer a few follow-up thoughts from my earlier post, and also provide some more links to the excellent articles out there on this topic.

Impenetrability of legalese to litigants and lay readers

Adam Wagner at the ever informative and readable UK Human Rights Blog wrote a post about the open justice agenda today, and if you have any suggestions or views please add them to the comments under his article.  The suggestions in his article and the comments range from 'accessbility' in terms of access to the raw text of judgments, court transcripts, statute law (more on this below), to issues of  'accessibility' in terms of readability and comprehensibility of judgments.  In addition to Wagner’s suggestions on judgement writing, I would add that given increasing numbers of litigants in person using the courts, officials need to consider making forms and correspondence more easily understood by the lay public.  If you've ever tried to make an application to the Court of Protection yourself you'll know what I mean (exercise: imagine being faced with this list if you wanted to make an application, then try to understand any of the forms themselves).  In this rather sad case from the Court of Protection, there's an interesting few paragraphs from 50-52, in which it transpires that a family failed to make an application to the court to set aside an order which had removed their father from their care (on the basis of safeguarding allegations, which later proved false), because they didn't understand the letter.  The council had applied 'without notice' to present the safeguarding allegations to the court and apply for permission to remove the father from their care, and they were not present at the initial hearing to defend themselves.  The judge criticises the use of legal shorthand in court correspondence when 'the order is in all likelihood to be served upon lay parties who do not have representation and lack any legal background' [56].

Wagner also discusses the possibility of courts issuing short press releases or summaries to accompany judgments.  This would doubtless be welcomed by anyone without access to Lexis, Westlaw or law reports, who often have to wade through an entire judgment to find the outcome and the basis for any decision.  It might also enhance the quality of media reporting of law which - in relation to the Court of Protection at least - is in my view often shamefully inaccurate and lacking in informed analysis.  It could help also help court users themselves; it is no justice if the courts users don't fully understand the reasons underpinning the judgment in their own case.  One of the suggestions in the comments below Wagner's blog is to provide a CD recording of the court case to all litigants, which would probably be welcomed by many... but would the courts be prepared to relinquish control to this extent on what is reported outside the court?

Recordings and broadcasts of court proceedings

In a really interesting post, journalist and information activist Heather Brooke writes about her experiences of trying to record, for reporting purposes, in an information tribunal.   She writes
Anisa Dhanji, the judge, said she was concerned with the hearing being recorded. ‘Usually such requests are made in advance so the tribunal can maintain the necessary degree of control over the transcript.’
The request to record the ruling was refused (in a separate, unrecorded, ruling).  Brookes goes on to say:
“Control” is exactly what a court shouldn’t be exerting. Once it is decided that it is open, there should be no restriction on how that open hearing is processed. She went on to say that she’d allow me to record now but I’d have to wait for a future ruling before I could “use” the recording.
To a certain extent I am inclined to agree, given that most courts are in any case open to the public.  I can certainly think of cases where I’d like to have access to a recording or the transcript to review what evidence was actually presented before the court.  Cases before the ECtHR are broadcast online, and Wagner discusses the possibility of televising Supreme Court cases here.  I can definitely see that there are strong public interest arguments in making available as much information about how law is made in the higher courts as possible.  As for tribunals and lower courts though, I’m less sure. 

How you feel about making available recordings and transcripts of court proceedings probably depends on your perspective.  It would certainly open up judicial decision making to much greater scrutiny, and you don’t have to be an enormous cynic to imagine this may be one reason the courts are dragging their feet on this - but surely our judges are robust enough to take criticism and stand by their decisions?  At present, (for most of us mortals, outside the chatter of the Inns of Court) all we can rely on for information about a case is contained within a judgment.  Sometimes there is information left out of judgments that we might have felt cast a different light on a decision, but we have no access to the ‘raw’ basis of the court’s decision. I can think of several cases where I do know a little more about the background and am surprised this material is not in the judgment. 

Audio-recordings and broadcasts might also open up legal professionals themselves to greater scrutiny, and whilst some confident souls might welcome this, it’s easy to see why others might not.  I can imagine a lot of legal professionals would detest their peers being able to watch or hear their performances, pick apart aspects of the case they’ve presented badly or left out altogether...  And there are other professionals’ whose work might be open to greater scrutiny.  There has been agitation for quite some time – at least in the family courts – for more information about the identity and evidence of expert witnesses to be made public.  I don’t think anyone is proposing we televise family court hearings, but I can imagine that in personal injury litigation, for instance, expert witnesses might be more reluctant to be instructed where they thought their evidence might be broadcast on television or the internet.  Of course, this might lead to improvements in the quality of evidence that was used, but it might also lead to a lack of professionals brave enough to take the stand.  I’d like to think that any professional giving evidence in court would be prepared to publicly stand by their comments, but I can also understand that it can be a daunting experience.

And then there’s the litigants themselves.  It’s not just the family courts which hear very personal aspects of people’s lives.  I admire the bravery of Elaine McDonald, bringing a case against the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea when they withdrew her overnight support to access the toilet, forcing her to rely on incontinence pads (despite being continent).  How would she have felt, I wonder, giving evidence on such a personal matter if her case were televised or audio-recorded, and potentially broadcast elsewhere?  Given that the courts are (in the main) open, is it possible to maintain that they might have rights to privacy that would be infringed if hearings were broadcast or audio-recorded?  Article 8 rights to privacy are qualified, and public interest arguments in favour of open justice might well outweigh the privacy rights of litigants, but does this alter with the status of the court?  Could we, for instance, maintain that in tribunals the privacy of litigants should be protected, but in the Supreme Court the balance is in favour of transparency?  And would the issues be any different if we were talking about transcripts, and not recordings?  Certainly, recordings may be likely to be preferred as they are much cheaper than transcripts (see Binary Law, Heather Brookes, and Judith Townsend’s blog for discussion of reasons for the costs of transcripts).  But recordings, unlike transcripts, are in much greater danger of being used for entertainment or political purposes which might sometimes run counter to the spirit of open and fair justice systems.

Getting information out of the court services and public authorities themselves...

In her article Brookes also raises the infuriating difficulty journalists (and researchers) have in getting hold of information about court proceedings.  Here’s a short list of research projects and requests for information I’ve had to abandon or seriously alter due to the reluctance of Her Majesty’s Courts Service, or other public authorities, to collate or share information about their legal activities.
  •  I wanted to find out about the kinds of cases were being brought under s44 Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the defences relied upon.  I tried the courts service, who didn’t seem to collect any detailed information centrally.  I was advised to search local papers (for the entire country) and look for references to court proceedings there...  And then, once you’ve found your news story, you can approach the court in question, ask permission and hand over hundreds (if not thousands) of pounds to a private copyright firm to type up a transcript.  Apparently this was to do with data protection, but it’s clearly a principle of data protection that eludes the media that reported on the individual cases and the copywriters who are happy to give me a transcript if I hand over the dough. (Incidentally, the CPS weren’t much more help, they only keep a record of the number of cases brought – not those that are successful, nor would they tell me what courts/regions to look in...)
  • Trying to find out how many deprivation of liberty authorisations have been successfully appealed by detainees or their families.  HMCS were able to tell me that there were 38 cases brought before the Court of Protection under the DoLS in England and Wales, but they couldn’t tell me who brought them (ie. was it detainees/representatives, or the supervisory bodies themselves referring the cases to the courts?).  Nor could they tell me the identities of the public authorities in question whose deprivation of liberty authorisations had been challenged (or, in the alternative, who had referred cases to the court themselves).  Nor even whether cases concerned local authorities (ie. detention in care homes) or PCTs (detention in hospitals).  This is particularly interesting, as I was only after the name of the public authority, from which it would surely have been impossible to ‘triangulate’ the identity of the private parties to proceedings.  This left me the very time consuming task of writing to every single local authority in England to ask whether they had had any DoLS authorisations challenged.  The results have been absolutely fascinating and not a little astonishing... but more on that another time.
  •  Before I had fully digested the import of s32 Freedom of Information Act 2000, I tried to use the Act to get public authorities to part with the written submissions they had made in various cases of interest to me.  Wouldn’t it be interesting to see what Birmingham City Council had to say in the case of Yl v Birmingham City Council (2007) (more interesting still, what the National Care Association had to say!)?  I’m no FOI law expert, but I am puzzled as to why their court submissions are exempt from the general rule of transparency.  Their legal actions are funded out of public money just as much as any other activities they undertake, and should (in my view) be just as transparent and accountable to the public.


Super-injunctions, hyper-injunctions and Hemming’s ‘secret prisoners’

It doesn’t take a legal expert to deduce that it might run counter to principles of fairness and open justice for our courts to issue injunctions against media outlets printing information that might be in the public interest, then making that a ‘super-injunction’ by banning media outlets from even reporting that they’ve had an injunction slapped on them, then increasing that to a ‘hyper-injunction’ by banning information-holders from discussing their silenced predicament either with a lawyer or their MP...  However, I’m no expert on information law, so I’m just going to point you to some excellent articles on super-injunctions and hyper-injunctions by the redoubtable Charon QC and Anna Raccoon.  Charlotte Harris at Inform writes about Lord Neuberger’s expressed concern at these injunctions, mentioned in his recent speech (pdf).  Gossip lovers out there might also like to check out this post by Guido Fawkes...

The recent furore was sparked off by MP John Hemming using parliamentary privilege to reveal the existence of said injunctions in parliament (see Hansard).  One aspect of his speech that has been less reported is Hemming’s allegations that social services departments and the family courts have been issuing their own injunctions against speaking to lawyers and MPs.  He writes:
...it is a dreadful abuse of state power to threaten to remove a child from the care of the parents because they deign to speak to their Member of Parliament. That happened to one of my constituents...
Hemming cites the Family Proceedings (Amendment) (No.2) Rules 2009, which state that a ‘party or the legal representative of a party, on behalf of and upon the instructions of that party, may communicate information relating to the proceedings to any person where necessary to enable that party...by confidential discussion, to obtain support, advice or assistance in the conduct of the proceedings’.  That is to say, if they need to speak to their MP to obtain support, nothing in the family court rules prevent them from doing so.

And then there is the Gilliland case which, on the surface at least, bears some parallels with hyper-injunctions inasmuch as a person cannot instruct a solicitor on the matter in question.  There is a lot to be said about issues relating to ‘capacity to litigate’, but I’m going to wait until the ECtHR have delivered their verdict on Stanev v Bulgaria before I do so, as it deals extensively with this issue (as well as Guardianship, detention in social care settings, positive obligations to mitigate the need for detention – a very important case, which is doubtless why it was heard by the Grand Chamber, and why they’re still deliberating...).  I don’t think it’s particularly helpful for me to speculate what’s going on in the Gilliland case, there being so little useful information about it in the public domain, but I am intrigued by Hemming’s comments about ‘secret prisoners’:
I have asked for an inquiry into all the secret prisoners we have. There are a number of different types of secret prisoner. There are people such as Matthew Hawkesworth; I cannot work out why he is in jail, but he is locked up... Yvonne Goder was jailed in secret for a short while last year. Her committal hearings and various discussions were all held in secret. She believes that three properties were taken from her family. This is a Court of Protection matter. On 17 January 2000, the capacity of her mother Efi Goder-Marsh to manage her own affairs was taken from her and given to her husband, who denies ever getting it... I have the transfer deeds; each was signed differently by somebody in an illegible manner, claiming to be Efi Goder-Marsh's husband. It looks different and he denies signing them. The documents were all witnessed by somebody in a particular solicitors' firm, with which I am in communication. Here is the difficulty. As it is a Court of Protection, the person cannot be identified without matters going into parliamentary proceedings. That causes all sorts of problems in terms of investigation. I hope that that will not be a problem in future. She is another secret prisoner; what was the situation there? Why were there secret committal hearings? It is a contempt issue.
I have no doubt that throughout the UK there are ‘secret prisoners’, as Hemming calls them, but I’m not sure at all sure what kind he refers to here, or what kind of inquiry he is calling for.  I'm not sure either whether he means that 'secret' courts are in contempt of parliament.  If anyone would like to enlighten me, I’d be fascinated.  It sounds as if some of these cases relate to deprivation of liberty authorised under the DoLS or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Protection, but it’s not terribly clear.  I hope this doesn’t sound trite, but I wonder whether the ‘secret prisoners’ that we should be really worrying about aren’t the ones that get before the courts at all, but the (likely tens of?) thousands of cases where people are de facto deprived of their liberty without authorisation or hearings before the courts at all.  In any case, if Hemming thinks there should be an inquiry into the operation of the deprivation of liberty safeguards, I’d back him all the way.  The problem is that I don’t find his exercise in transparency terribly transparent in itself...

Database and technology wish list

Just to finish off, I’d like to reiterate my frustration that the only copies of legislation made freely available online are not updated when statutes are amended, leaving people without pricey subscription services in the dark as to parliament’s most recent intentions.  I’d like to put out a plea to Bailii and the courts services to a) get more Court of Protection case law online and b) consider improving how this information is organised.  At present, if you know the name or details of a hearing, it’s not too difficult to locate it, but it would be great cases were indexed in the same way as Westlaw in terms of what cases they cite, or cite them.  What statutes they involve.  As a next best option, to consider making them searchable through Google.  As Adam Wagner pointed out on Twitter today, Google already indexes all American legal judgments, it’d be fantastic if we had that here.  For people outside the loop, like myself, it’d also be handy to have a case tracker, which told you which cases were coming up (with bare facts about them – along the lines of what ECtHR provide), whether decided cases were being appealed and – most importantly perhaps – what reporting restrictions were placed on them.

I’ve written far more than I mean to, apologies, as Blaise Pascal once said, “I would have written a shorter letter, but I did not have the time”.