tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7327718065135964598.post358887469132323917..comments2023-08-10T15:02:51.259+01:00Comments on The Small Places: Deprivation of liberty and the struggle for meaningLucy Serieshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07820866715125284389noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7327718065135964598.post-27325655489051823142012-07-10T14:41:15.919+01:002012-07-10T14:41:15.919+01:00Hi Richard,
Thanks very much for your comment. I...Hi Richard,<br /><br />Thanks very much for your comment. I increasingly feel that in thinking about safeguards we need to distinguish two important issues, which I call the 'where' question and the 'how' question. The 'where' question is where disputes arise about *where* a person should be - should they be admitted to hospital, to a care home, sent home from either of those, to live with family etc? These cases seem to me to capture the more traditional character of Article 5, although I would regard Re RK and Re C as being within their ambit. I think these types of cases clearly need something like an appeal mechanism, but preferably a lot more accessible than DoLS.<br /><br />The second set of issues, the 'how' issues, relate to *how* a person is being cared for in terms of restrictions. People who are subject to continuous supervision and control, high levels of restraint, seclusion, high levels of sedation, would fall within the 'how' question. It strikes me that what's really crucial here is some kind of independent scrutiny of care delivery, and some form of advocacy to help challenge excessive or inappropriate restrictions. I would envisage something more like long term independent advocacy and visitation being more appropriate in these circumstances. Mechanisms to refer human rights violations to court, or cases giving rise to concerns like in the 'blue room' case or in P v Cheshire, would be appropriate - but not necessary in all circumstances.<br /><br />Yesterday I was reading the 1763 House of Commons select committee report on Madhouses - which precipitated the earliest mental health legislation. They said there were two issues of concern to them: 1) inappropriate admission and confinement; and 2) the conditions of confinement. These seem to me to be broadly the same issues we are grappling with today. In 1763 two overlapping remedies were proposed: certification required for admission; and a system of licensing and visitation to improve conditions. It strikes me that we're fumbling our way back to this approach...<br /><br />LucyLucy Serieshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07820866715125284389noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7327718065135964598.post-12597459828983561052012-07-10T14:29:51.742+01:002012-07-10T14:29:51.742+01:00Hi lucy
Considering language as a creative and st...Hi lucy<br /><br />Considering language as a creative and structuring process, with inherent conflict, is also a very good way to critique the use of the term 'normal' in identifying a comparator: to define my normal is an essential part of my liberty. <br /><br />Is there not a wider problem? In seeking to define dol in order to maximise protection to the vulnerable the current legal discourse contains rules that tie its defining and redefining to how it has been used in other legal contexts and therefore do not allow it to be defined purely in terms of the question of maximising safeguards. These 'rules' also allow its definition to be contested to promote other interests of other groups. <br /><br />However, there is nothing stopping the development of a statute that starts from the questions of what vulnerable groups need what safeguards. Providing it covers those to whom art 5 applies with sufficient safeguards to meet art 5 requirements, there is nothing stopping it from going beyond and also applying the safeguards to others. <br /><br />?Richard Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13496494588173512552noreply@blogger.com